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Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness
and Hearsay Evidence
Margaret Bull Kovera,* Roger C. Park,**
and Steven D. Penrod***
The study presented in this Article examines mock jurors'
ability to differentiate between good and poor hearsay testi-
mony. It suggests that mock jurors are more skeptical of hear-
say testimony than eyewitness testimony. In addition, subjects
indicated more sensitivity to the varying quality and accuracy
of testimony from hearsay witnesses than eyewitnesses. This
Article presents the study's findings and reviews its implica-
tions for hearsay reform.
I. THE CONTROVERSIAL NATURE OF THE RULE
AGAINST HEARSAY
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testify-
ing at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted."'- Unless one of the many excep-
tions to the hearsay rule applies, hearsay testimony is inadmis-
sible at trial.
When hearsay is received, the adverse party cannot explore
defects in the out-of-court declarant's memory, perception, nar-
ration, or sincerity. The principal reason for excluding hearsay
is the fear that the jury will be incapable of accurately evaluat-
ing the declarant's credibility.2 Some commentators also have
expressed concern about other effects, including the danger of
in-court witnesses fabricating testimony.3
* Ph.D. candidate, social psychology, University of Minnesota.
** Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
*** Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
2. Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, Research Essay: A Prelimi-
nary Empirical Enquiry Concerning the Prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in
American Courts, 15 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 65, 70-72 (1991) (explaining that
jurors' inability "to analyze second hand information" is one of the "funda-
mental props of the hearsay rule").
3. For a full catalog of possible reasons for excluding hearsay, see Roger
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A number of legal commentators have urged lawmakers to
liberalize the rule against hearsay, or at least substantially re-
duce its exclusionary effect. Some critics have urged outright
abolition of the hearsay doctrine.4 Others believe that courts
should admit hearsay in civil cases if the party producing the
evidence gives notice to the opponent.5 Still others suggest that
courts admit hearsay upon a discretionary finding by the trial
judge that it is trustworthy.6 American jurisdictions have been
slow to accept these reforms but a number of Commonwealth
jurisdictions have liberalized their hearsay rules along these
lines.
7
Proponents of reform argue "that it is better to admit
flawed testimony for what it is worth, giving the opponent a
chance to expose its defects, than to take the chance of a mis-
carriage of justice because the trier is deprived of informa-
tion." Critics have argued further that since jurors routinely
rely on hearsay testimony in their everyday lives, they have
sufficient practice judging such evidence.9 Whether jurors are
capable of accurately judging the validity of hearsay evidence is
an empirical question. This study suggests that jurors are, in
fact, skeptical of hearsay evidence and capable of differentiat-
ing between accurate and inaccurate hearsay testimony.
II. JURORS' PERCEPTIONS OF WITNESS TESTIMONY
AND CREDIBILITY
There have been relatively few empirical investigations of
jurors' evaluations of hearsay witnesses and their testimony. In
a study conducted by Professors Landsman and Rakos, mock
jurors read a trial transcript which included both hearsay and
non-hearsay evidence.' 0 The researchers systematically varied
C. Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 51,
55-67 (1987).
4. See Paul J. Brysh, Comment, Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 609 (1974).
5. See Park, supra note 3, at 112-14, 119-22 (discussing notice based pro-
posals for admitting hearsay in civil contexts).
6. See, e.g., Irving Younger, Reflections on the Rule Against Hearsay, 32
S.C. L. REV. 281, 293 (1980) (arguing that admission of hearsay could follow a
judicial determination of trustworthiness); see also Charles T. McCormick,
Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 218, 219 (1956) (same).
7. See Colin Tapper, Presentation at the Hearsay Reform Conference
(Sept. 6, 1991) (tracing hearsay reform in England and Wales from 1938 to the
present and discussing new schemes of reform in South Africa and Scotland).
8. Park, supra note 3, at 52.
9. Id, at 54.
10. Landsman & Rakos, supra note 2, at 73.
[Vol. 76:703
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the strength of the hearsay testimony and the strength of the
remaining evidence using different versions of a trial tran-
script.1' The subjects reported that strong or moderate hearsay
testimony was more important to their decisions than weak
hearsay testimony or innocuous statements, but they were no
more likely to convict a defendant against whom strong hearsay
testimony had been introduced than one against whom no hear-
say evidence had been introduced.12 The authors suggested
that the lack of influence that hearsay evidence has on verdicts
may be the result of jurors' skepticism regarding hearsay
testimony.13
Miene, Park, Borgida, and Anderson conducted another
study that examined jurors' perceptions of hearsay testimony.14
The study used a videotaped trial simulation to present subjects
with either circumstantial evidence, hearsay testimony and cir-
cumstantial evidence, eyewitness evidence and circumstantial
evidence, or a combination of all available evidence. The hear-
say witnesses and the eyewitnesses provided virtually identical
factual evidence. Nonetheless, jurors were less likely to convict
the defendant when they heard hearsay testimony than when
they heard eyewitness testimony.1 5 Mock jurors also reported
that they considered eyewitness testimony more influential and
more reliable than the testimony provided by the hearsay wit-
ness.'6 Furthermore, subjects rarely found the hearsay evi-
dence determinative of the trial's outcome.1 7 On the basis of
these findings, the authors concluded that jurors do not rely
heavily on hearsay testimony. In fact, it appeared that mock ju-
rors in their study undervalued hearsay testimony.
Although little research has focused on the effects of hear-
say testimony on juror decision making, there is a wealth of in-
11. I.
12. Id- at 75-76.
13. I& at 76. Landsman and Rakos, however, did not compare the sub-
ject's evaluations of hearsay testimony and the other evidence to determine
whether a difference in evaluations was statistically significant.
14. Peter Miene et al., The Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, Presented at
the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Boston, Mas-
sachusetts (Aug. 1990) in CURRENT IssuEs IN INDIviDuAL AND GROUP DECI-
sION-MAKING REsEARCH (N. John Castellan ed., forthcoming 1992).
15. Id- Overall, the conviction rates were not significantly different under
the circumstantial and hearsay conditions, nor were the rates different be-
tween the eyewitness and all evidence conditions.
16. Id-
17. Id In open-ended responses to a question asking the subjects for the
most important pieces of evidence presented at trial, the hearsay witness's tes-
timony was rarely mentioned.
1992]
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formation on jurors' perceptions of eyewitness testimony. Most
psycholegal research on jurors' perceptions of eyewitness testi-
mony has found that jurors are insensitive to factors that affect
the accuracy of eyewitnesses' memories.' 8 A study by Cutler,
18. See, e.g., Steven G. Fox & H.A. Walters, The Impact of General Versus
Specific Expert Testimony and Eyewitness Confidence Upon Mock Juror Judg-
ment, 10 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 215 (1986); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-zjror
Evaluations of Eyewitness Testimony: A Test of Metamemory Hypotheses, 16
J. APPLIED Soc. PsYCHOL. 447 (1986) [hereinafter Lindsay et al., Test of
Metamemory Hypotheses] (illustrating that neither lighting conditions at the
time of a criminal incident nor the length of the perpetrator's exposure to a
witness significantly influenced jurors' evaluation of an eyewitness); Gary L.
Wells et al., The Tractability of Eyewitness Confidence and Its Implications
for Triers of Fact, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 688 (1981) (suggesting that, because
eyewitness testimony is tractable-subject to "briefing" etc.-confidence in a
false memory can be enhanced and is therefore not an indicator of witness ac-
curacy); Gary L. Wells & Michael R. Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications? Using Memory for Peripheral Detail
Can Be Misleading, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 682 (1981) [hereinafter Wells &
Leippe, Memory for Peripheral Detail] (suggesting that jurors place too great
a weight on eyewitnesses' memories of peripheral detail); Gary L. Wells et al.,
Fjffects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in Judging the
Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 275 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Wells et al., Effects of Expert Psychological Advice] (reviewing recent re-
search regarding human performance in judging eyewitness testimony and
concluding that jurors are overly willing to believe in the accuracy of eyewit-
ness testimony); Bernard E. Whitley, Jr. & Martin S. Greenberg, The Role of
Eyewitness Confidence in Juror Perceptions of Credibility, 16 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 387 (1986) (discussing, on the issue of how well jurors interpret eye-
witness testimony, the different assumptions made by lay people and the judi-
cial system compared to those by psychological researchers).
Research methodologies in this area have varied. Some researchers have
used questionnaire studies which assessed the potential jurors' knowledge re-
garding factors which affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony (often using
a multiple-choice format). See, e.g., Kenneth A. Deffenbacher & Elizabeth F.
Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Be-
havior?, 6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 15 (1982) (concluding that there is no common
understanding of variables which affect eyewitness testimony); A. Daniel
Yarmey & Hazel P. Jones, Accuracy of Memory of Male and Female Eyewit-
ness to Criminal Assault and Rape, 2 BULL. OF THE PSYCHONOMIC SoCIETY 89
(1983) (determining that attitudes towards rape do not lead to more reliable
identification by eyewitnesses in a simulated sexual assault context). In other
studies, researchers asked subjects to predict accuracy rates of eyewitnesses in
experiments after the witnessing conditions were described to the subject. See,
e.g., Michael R. Leippe et al., Crime Seriousness as a Determinate of Accuracy
in Eyewitness Identifcation Accuracy, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 345 (1978) (il-
lustrating that eyewitness accuracy is a function of the perceived seriousness
of an event). Some researchers have employed mock jury studies in which
subjects tried a case which included eyewitness testimony. See Brian L. Cutler
et al., Juror Decisionmaking in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 12 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 41 (1988) (concluding that lay people are insensitive to factors
that influence eyewitness testimony); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?, 66 J. AP-
[Vol. 76:703
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Penrod, and Stuve found that actual jurors, as well as mock ju-
rors, have difficulty differentiating between good eyewitness
testimony and poor eyewitness testimony.19 Overall, these
studies unequivocally demonstrate that jurors are not sensitive
to factors which reduce the probative value of eyewitness testi-
mony, such as retention interval, disguise of a robber, lineup in-
structions, and lineup construction. Therefore, jurors'
judgments about eyewitness accuracy are often erroneous.
Given that jurors' cannot differentiate between accurate and in-
accurate eyewitnesses, is there any reason to believe that jurors
are capable of gauging the accuracy of hearsay witnesses? If ju-
rors cannot judge the accuracy of a hearsay witness's descrip-
tion of an event, are jurors able to assign the appropriate
weight to hearsay evidence? Finally, even if jurors can differ-
entiate between accurate and inaccurate hearsay testimony,
will the introduction of hearsay evidence decrease jurors' satis-
faction with the judicial process? The study in this Article at-
tempts to address these questions by examining jurors'
perceptions of the testimony offered by eyewitnesses and hear-
say witnesses to a single event.
III. METHOD
A. SUBJECTS
One-hundred sixty-two undergraduates from the Univer-
sity of Minnesota participated in this study. These participants
received extra credit in their introductory psychology course or
four dollars compensation.
B. PROCEDURE
Subjects acted as jurors at a professional misconduct hear-
ing. Researchers told the subjects that their task was to deter-
mine whether the attorney under investigation was guilty of
manufacturing a defense for his client. Participants read a de-
scription of the charges which had been brought against the at-
torney. The charge alleged that Paul Stewart, an attorney, had
been representing Tom Mannion, a criminal defendant charged
with murder. Researchers further explained that although it is
ethical for an attorney to defend a client, even if the attorney
PLIED PSYCHOL. 79 (1981) (finding a small relationship between witness accu-
racy and witness confidence leading to jurors placing too much weight on
witness accuracy when confidence is high).
19. See Brian L. Cutler, et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identifica-
tion Evidence, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1990).
1992]
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does not believe in the innocence of the client, it is unethical
for the attorney to offer false evidence or otherwise urge his
client to fabricate a defense.
All subjects watched the videotaped testimony of a law
clerk who was an eyewitness to Stewart's alleged misconduct.
The law clerk was present during two meetings between Stew-
art and Mannion in which they discussed Mannion's defense.
Some subjects also watched the testimony of a hearsay witness
who reported the substance of her conversation with a second
law clerk who was also present at the two meetings.
Three graduate students in psychology played the role of
the law clerk eyewitness to the two meetings. They viewed a
portion of the film Anatomy of a Murder. The film portrayed
two meetings between an attorney and his client. The eyewit-
nesses were interviewed about the meetings after varying inter-
vals, in some cases one day, in others two days or one week.
The researchers videotaped the eyewitnesses as they answered
questions about what they had witnessed. Researchers first
asked the eyewitnesses to describe everything they
remembered from the meetings. The researchers then asked
eyewitnesses specific questions about general topics that were
discussed during the meetings. Finally, the interrogators asked
the eyewitnesses specific questions about particular events that
occurred during the two meetings. However, the researchers
did not show the subjects the portions of the videotape that
contained the eyewitnesses' responses to specific questions.20
Six graduate students in psychology also served as hearsay
witnesses in the simulated hearing. The researchers showed
the hearsay witnesses the eyewitnesses' videotaped responses to
the first two series of questions.2 1 After either a one-day or a
one-week delay, the two hearsay witnesses for each eyewitness,
in turn, answered the same questions the eyewitnesses had an-
20. These specific questions were included so that the accuracy of the wit-
nesses' recall could be more thoroughly assessed.
21. The graduate students were instructed to pretend they were having a
conversation with a friend who is a law clerk while they were watching the
videotape. Each of the hearsay witnesses viewed one of the eyewitnesses' re-
sponses to general questions about the two meetings. A schematic represent-
ing the pairing of eyewitnesses and hearsay witnesses during the production of
stimulus materials is presented in Figure 1. See Figure 1, infra note 22.
The hearsay witnesses were shown the eyewitnesses' responses only to
the more general questions because it would be virtually impossible for the
hearsay witnesses to have the requisite prior knowledge that would enable
them to ask about the details of the meeting unless they too had observed the
meeting.
[Vol. 76:703
HeinOnline -- 76 Minn. L. Rev. 708 1991-1992
JURY STUDY
swered. The researchers also recorded their interrogations of
the hearsay witnesses on videotape, removed the portion of the
interrogation that consisted of specific questions, and coded the
answers in the same manner they had done for the eyewit-
nesses' answers.22 The responses were coded for their accuracy
in representing the actual event, not the account they heard
from the eyewitness.
Thirty-two subjects saw only a simple eyewitness's testi-
mony.23 The remaining subjects saw a simple eyewitness and a
simple hearsay witness testify.2 Fifteen conditions resulted:
subjects in three conditions saw only an eyewitness, subjects in
six conditions saw an eyewitness paired with a hearsay witness
22. Figure 1 is a schematic representing the pairing of eyewitnesses and






/ / I \ /
Goo Gorodl Poor oodoo
IlHearsay Iflorou Hearsay Iueorsou osg I Hooro I ersoy I
nItion''°  Ition"'° Condition 1 ~I o°"°" ~ tIo° d n' ItIr'°I
23. Figure 2 is a schematic representing the pairing of eyewitnesses and
hearsay witnesses in each experimental condition.
Figure 2
24. The researchers never paired testimony of a hearsay witness with the
testimony of the eyewitness who served as the declarant for that hearsay wit-
ness's testimony.
1992]
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who testified after a relatively short delay, and subjects in the
remaining six conditions viewed an eyewitness in conjunction
with a hearsay witness who testified after a relatively long
delay.25
After watching the videotaped testimony, participants re-
ported a verdict and indicated their confidence in that verdict.
The subjects also rated the eyewitnesses' testimony and, where
applicable, the hearsay witnesses' testimony in terms of their
confidence in the testimony's accuracy. Finally, in order to test
the participants' knowledge of the trial facts, the researchers
asked the subjects to respond to the same questions about the
two meetings that the witnesses had answered. 26
C. EVALUATIONS OF WITNESS TESTIMONY
The researchers evaluated the mock jurors' responses to
videotaped testimony by analyzing the subjects' questionnaire
responses.27 The analysis identified the subjects' reactions to
the eyewitness and hearsay witness testimony, measured their
recall of trial facts, and distilled their primary judgments about
the case.
Researchers first averaged jurors' responses to questions
relating to eyewitness testimony.28 The subjects' responses re-
flected their evaluations of the completeness of the testimony,
their confidence in the eyewitness's memory of the meetings,
the perceptiveness of the witness's observations, the quality of
the witness's memory, and the witness's confidence and effec-
tiveness. Raters also averaged the subjects' responses reflecting
their impressions of the witness's character, including charac-
teristics such as believability, sincerity and honesty.29 Raters
then created scales to measure the mock jurors' perceptions of
the eyewitness's overall accuracy of memory,30 the usefulness
of the eyewitness testimony,31 the witness's motivation to dis-
25. See Figure 2, supra note 23.
26. The most general questions (i.e., those that merely asked respondents
to describe everything they could about the two meetings) were not used be-
cause researchers believed that subjects would provide little information in re-
sponse to this type of question on a written survey.
27. Separate principal component analyses with varimax rotation were
conducted on items about the eyewitness, the hearsay witness, and the case in
general.
28. Cronbach's alpha = .9341.
29. Alpha = .7669.
30. Alpha = .7607.
31. Alpha = .7269.
[Vol. 76:703
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tort their testimony,32 and the eyewitness's likability33
Researchers also created scales to assess subjects' percep-
tions of the hearsay witnesses and their testimony. As with the
eyewitness testimony, researchers evaluated the testimony's
quality34 and usefulness.as The researchers assessed percep-
tions of the accuracy of the witnesses' memory,36 motivation to
distort testimony,37 character,38 and likability.39 Finally, the re-
searchers evaluated the subjects' responses to determine
whether they felt that they received enough information to
gauge the credibility, accuracy and honesty of the eyewitness
4°
and the hearsay witness.4 '
Raters also coded the mock jurors' answers to the recall
questions about events at the meetings to determine which
events the subjects recalled correctly, and identify the subjects'
errors of omission and commission. They asked subjects gen-
eral questions about the topics discussed at the meetings, spe-
cific questions about the particular events of the meetings, and
general questions about events at the two meetings (taking into
account overlap between information provided in response to
the general and specific questions). Additionally, graduate stu-
dents rated the events of the two meetings to determine their
relative importance in determining the guilt or innocence of
the defendant.4 The researchers used the weights to create a
scale to assess the amount of information the mock jurors re-
called correctly.
43
32. Alpha = .6345.
33. Alpha = .6047.
34. Alpha = .9603.
35. Alpha = .7722.
36. Alpha = .7959.
37. Alpha = .6252.
38. Alpha = .7913.
39. Alpha = .7030.
40. Alpha = .8698.
41. Alpha = .8723.
42. Weights representing the importance of each event were computed by
averaging the ratings for each item. These weights were used to compute
measures of the total number of events recalled correctly and errors of omis-
sion and commission.
43. The scale consisted of the sum of the number of events recalled cor-
rectly and a reverse coding of the number of events omitted when general and
specific questions were asked, the total number of events that were recalled
and a weighted measure of the total number of recalled events. Alpha =
.8528. Errors of commission committed when general and specific questions
were asked, the total errors of commission and the total errors of commission
weighted for the importance of the events incorrectly recalled were summed
to create a scale measuring the errors of commission made by the mock jurors'
in their recall of the evidence. Alpha = .6624.
19921
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D. PRIMARY JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE CASE
Researchers created three scales that measured the jurors'
evaluations of the evidence. The first of these scales reflected
the jurors' assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence pro-
vided by the eyewitness and consisted of the averaged re-
sponses to three items which ask the subject whether they have
sufficient evidence to gauge the credibility, accuracy, and hon-
esty of the eyewitness. 4
The second scale gauged jurors' assessment of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence proffered by the hearsay witness.45 This
scale averaged responses to three items asking for judgments
about the sufficiency of the evidence in evaluating the credibil-
ity, accuracy, and honesty of the hearsay witness.
The third scale assessed the mock jurors' general satisfac-
tion with the evidence. The scale was created by averaging re-
sponses to four items reflecting the jurors' assessment of
whether they received sufficient evidence to make a judgment,
whether the evidence they received was appropriate for the
case, whether they received all the evidence that was available,
and whether they were satisfied with the evidence that they re-
ceived.4 6 Subjects also rendered a verdict and indicated their
confidence in the accuracy of their verdict.4 7 All of the scales
listed above are shown in Table 1.
IV. RESULTS
A. ACCURACY OF THE WITNESSES
The study found that the eyewitness testimony's accuracy
was directly related to the length of the delay between the
observation and the recall of the events. Raters coded the eye-
witnesses' responses to reflect the number of events and state-
ments from the two meetings that the eyewitnesses correctly
recalled. They also scored the witnesses' responses to assess
the number of errors of omission and commission that the wit-
nesses made. These scores showed that the responses to gen-
eral questions provided by the witness after a one-day delay48
44. Alpha = .8698. Scale values ranged from one to nine, with higher
scores indicating greater sufficiency of the evidence.
45. Alpha = .8723.
46. Scale values range from one to nine, with higher numbers indicating
greater satisfaction with the evidence. Alpha = .8767.
47. This rating occurred on a nine-point Likert-type scale.
48. The scores after a one day delay were 30 correct, 27 omissions, and no
commissions.
[Vol. 76:703
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were more accurate than the testimony of witnesses who testi-
fied after a longer delay. Similarly, the responses of the wit-
nesses who testified two days after viewing the meetings were
more accurate than the responses of witnesses who testified af-
ter a one-week delay.49 Hearsay witnesses who testified after
one day were more accurate than the hearsay witnesses who
testified after one week.50
B. EVALUATIONS OF EYEWITNESSES
The mock jurors' perceptions of the eyewitness's likability
were affected by the specific eyewitness.51 A post-hoe compari-
son of mean differences indicated that subjects liked a good
eyewitness better than an average eyewitness.5 2 In contrast,
eyewitnesses, the quality of hearsay witnessing conditions, eye-
witnesses' witnessing condition interactions and individual
hearsay witnesses did not help explain the subjects' evaluations
of the quality of the eyewitnesses' testimony, the accuracy of
the eyewitnesses' testimony, the eyewitnesses' character, the
usefulness of the eyewitnesses' testimony or the eyewitnesses'
49. Those testifying two days after viewing scored 20 correct as opposed to
11 correct for those testifying one week after viewing;, those testifying after
two days committed 34 omissions as opposed to 46 for those testifying after one
week; and those testifying after two days committed three commissions as op-
posed to one for those testifying after one week.
50. Here, those testifying one day after viewing scored 13 correct as op-
posed to 4.67 correct for those testifying one week after viewing;, those testify-
ing after one day committed 43 omissions as opposed to 52.67 for those
testifying after one week; and those testifying after one day committed one
commission as opposed to 1.67 for those testifying after one week.
51. F(2,159) = 3.26, p =.04. Hierarchical regressions were conducted on
the eyewitness scales with two variables coded for the three eyewitnesses
(good, average, poor) entered first, two variables coded for the quality of hear-
say witnessing conditions (good, poor, none) entered second, four variables
coded for the interactions between the eyewitness and the hearsay witnessing
conditions variables were entered third and finally, six variables coded to rep-
resent the six different hearsay witnesses or the absence of a hearsay witness
were entered last. The effects of the individual hearsay witnesses on jurors'
judgments are not of theoretical interest but were entered last to see how
much variance in jurors' judgments is accounted for by individual differences
in witnesses, over and above other variables.
52. ps: good = 5.8, average = 5.27, poor = 5.6.
1992]
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motivation to distort their testimony. Table 1 summarizes dif-
ferences in jurors" perceptions of the eyewitnesses.53
C. EVALUATIONS OF HEARSAY WITNESS
Several of the mock jurors' evaluations of the hearsay wit-
nesses were significantly affected by the quality of the hearsay
witnessing conditions, over and above contributions made by
the three eyewitnesses.5 4 For example, the jurors' evaluations
of the quality of the hearsay witness's testimony varied depend-
53. Table 1
Summary of the effects of independent variables on jurors' perceptions of eye-
witness and hearsay witness testimony, general trial judgments, and recall
measures*




Quality - - - -
Accuracy - - - -
Character - - - -
Usefulness - - - -
Likeable .04 - - -
Motivation to - - - -
Distort
Hearsay Witness Judgments
Quality - .18 - .14
Accuracy - .13 - .08
Character - .08 - -
Usefulness - .14 - -
Likeable .07 .07 - -
Motivation to - - -
Distort
Evidence Judgments
Satisfaction - .05 - -
Sufficiency of - - -
eyewitness
Sufficiency of - -
hearsay
Verdict confidence - - .10
Recall Measures
Recall/Trial facts .07 .04 - -
Errors of - -
commission
* Numbers in the table reprsent the change in R-squared with the addition of the
new preditors. R-squared change is reported only when it is statistically
significant at p<.05
54. Hierarchical regressions were conducted on the hearsay witness scales
with two variables coded for the three eyewitnesses (good, average, poor) en-
tered first, one variable coded for the quality of hearsay witnessing conditions
(good, poor) entered second, two variables coded for the interactions between
the eyewitness and the hearsay conditions variables were entered third and fi-
nally, five variables coded for the six different hearsay witnesses were entered
last. Table 1, supra note 53, summarizes the differences in the jurors' ratings
of the hearsay witnesses.
[Vol. 76:703
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ing on the hearsay witnessing conditions.a The jurors per-
ceived the quality of the testimony proffered by hearsay
witnesses one day after their initial exposure to the informa-
tion as being superior to the testimony provided by the wit-
nesses who were asked to recall the information after longer
retention intervals.ss Additionally, the quality of the hearsay
witnessing conditions affected the subjects' perceptions of the
accuracy of the hearsay witness's memory.57 Subjects rated the
hearsay witnesses who testified under good witnessing condi-
tions as having more accurate memories than the hearsay wit-
nesses who testified after one week.ss
The subjects' evaluations of the hearsay witnesses' charac-
ter were similarly affected by the hearsay witnessing condi-
tions.59 Subjects perceived that witnesses who testified after a
short interval had a better character than hearsay witnesses
who testified after a longer interval.60 Finally, the quality of
the hearsay witnessing conditions affected the usefulness of the
hearsay witnesses' testimony over and above the eyewitnesses'
contributions.61 Subjects who viewed the hearsay testimony of-
fered after a shorter interval perceived the testimony to be
more useful than those subjects who viewed the hearsay wit-
nesses who testified after a longer interval.6 2
The subjects' evaluations of the hearsay witnesses' testi-
mony were affected by the individual hearsay witness.63 The
55. F(3,124) = 11.652, p < .0001.
56. t (126) = 5.31, p < .0001 (ps: good = 4.62, poor = 3.07).
57. F(3,125) = 18.702, p <.0001.
58. t (127) = 4.35, p < .0001 (Vs: good = 4.69, poor = 3.54).
59. F(3,126) = 10.947, p =.0012.
60. t (128) = 3.36, p = .001 (us: good = 6.0, poor = 5.21).
61. F(3, 126) = 22.304, p < .0001.
62. t(128) = 4.75, p < .0001 (us: good = 4.78, poor = 3.43).
63. Specifically, the individual hearsay witness affected the perceived
quality of the hearsay testimony. F(9,118) = 6.869, p = .0001. Subjects evalu-
ated the hearsay witness who viewed an average eyewitness under poor hear-
say witnessing conditions differently from all the other hearsay witnesses
except the witness who viewed a good eyewitness under poor hearsay witness-
ing conditions. In addition, the subjects' evaluations indicated that they were
able to distinguish between the "good eyewitness-poor conditions" hearsay wit-
ness and the "poor eyewitness-poor conditions," "good eyewitness-good condi-
tions" and "poor eyewitness-good conditions" hearsay witnesses. (p < .05 (ps:
good eyewitness-good conditions = 4.76; good eyewitness-poor conditions =
2.69; average eyewitness-good conditions = 3.97; average eyewitness-poor con-
ditions = 2.19; poor eyewitness-good conditions = 5.13; poor eyewitness-poor
conditions = 4.38)).
Moreover, the specific hearsay witness affected subjects' perceptions about
the accuracy of the hearsay witnesses' testimony. F(9,119) = 2.928, p = .0238.
Subjects rated the "average eyewitness-poor conditions" hearsay witness dif-
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quality of the hearsay witnessing conditions significantly af-
fected jurors' perceptions of the likability of the hearsay wit-
ness.6 Subjects liked hearsay witnesses who testified under
good witnessing conditions better than hearsay witnesses who
testified under poor conditions.65
The different eyewitnesses that the hearsay witness viewed
affected mock jurors' perceptions of the likability of the hear-
say witnesses.66 Hearsay witnesses who saw the good eyewit-
ness were not liked as well as the hearsay witnesses who saw
the poor eyewitness. 67 Eyewitnesses, the quality of hearsay wit-
nessing conditions, the combination of eyewitness with witness-
ing conditions, and individual hearsay witnesses did not affect
the subjects' evaluations of the hearsay witnesses' motivation to
distort their testimony. Table 1 depicts a summary of the dif-
ferences in jurors' ratings of the hearsay witnesses.6 8
D. RECALL OF TRIAL FACTS
The study also indicates that the eyewitnesses contribute to
the mock jurors' ability to recall accurately the events of the
two meetings as related at the trial.6 9 Subjects who viewed the
good eyewitnesses recalled trial events more accurately than
the subjects who saw either of the other two eyewitnesses.
70
The quality of hearsay witnessing conditions also contributed,
over and above the contribution of the eyewitnesses, to the ac-
curacy of subjects' recall of trial events.71 However, there were
no differences between subjects who viewed hearsay witnesses
who testified following good witnessing conditions as opposed
to hearsay witnesses who testified under poor witnessing condi-
tions. Nor did researchers identify a recall difference between
subjects who viewed the testimony of a hearsay witness and
those who did not.
72
ferently from witnesses who testified under good witnessing conditions (p <
.05), irrespective of the quality of the eyewitness's testimony that they heard.
(Its: good eyewitness-good conditions = 4.37; good eyewitness-poor conditions
= 3.52; average eyewitness-good conditions = 4.89; average eyewitness-poor
conditions = 2.92; poor eyewitness-good conditions = 4.85; poor eyewitness-
poor conditions = 4.21)
64. F(3,125) = 10.775, p =.0013.
65. t(127) = 3.29, p = .001 (lis: good = 6.29, poor = 4.49).
66. F(2,126) = 4.513, p = .0128.
67. p < .05 (ps: good=4.43, average=6.00, poor=6.32).
68. See Table 1, supra note 53.
69. F(2,157) = 5.969, p = .0032.
70. Ips: good = 363.21, average = 330.81, poor = 325.45.
71. F(4,155) = 3.134, p = .0463.
72. [Ls: good = 353.70, poor = 331.34, none = 328.76.
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The individual hearsay witnesses significantly affected the
number of errors of commission made by the mock jurors dur-
ing their recall of the events,7 3 although the eyewitnesses, the
hearsay witnessing conditions, and the interaction of the eye-
witnesses and the hearsay witnessing conditions did not.74 Ta-
ble 1 summarizes these effects.75
E. PRIMARY JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE CASE
Individual eyewitnesses, the quality of hearsay witnessing
conditions, interactions between eyewitness and hearsay wit-
nessing conditions, and individual hearsay witnesses did not af-
fect jurors' perceptions of the sufficiency of the evidence to
gauge the credibility, accuracy and honesty of the eyewitnesses
or the hearsay witnesses or their ultimate verdicts. The results
from these analyses are reported in Table 1.76
The quality of the hearsay witnessing conditions affected
mock jurors' satisfaction with the testimony that they re-
ceived.77 Jurors were more satisfied with the evidence when
they viewed hearsay witnesses who testified under good condi-
tions than when they viewed hearsay witnesses who testified
under poor conditions.78 In contrast, subjects who did not view
any hearsay testimony were no more or less satisfied with the
evidence that they received than those subjects who viewed
hearsay testimony.79 Individual hearsay witnesses did, how-
ever, affect jurors' confidence in their verdict.80
73. F(12,147) = 2.887, p = .0245.
74. Post hoc analyses indicate that there were no significant differences
among the means (Vs: no hearsay witness = 85.43; good eyewitness-good condi-
tions = 89.75; good eyewitness-poor conditions = 71.40; average eyewitness-
good conditions = 88.80; average eyewitness-poor conditions = 74.05; poor eye-
witness-good conditions = 85.06; poor eyewitness-poor conditions = 93.93).
75. See Table 1, supra note 53.
76. Id-
77. F(4, 157) = 3.874, p = .0228. A series of hierarchical regression analy-
ses were also conducted on the scales that assessed jurors' satisfaction with the
evidence as well as their verdict and verdict confidence.
78. (Vs: good = 4.11, poor = 3.24, none = 4.02).
79. On the other hand, eyewitnesses, the quality of hearsay witnessing
conditions, the combination of eyewitness with witnessing conditions, and indi-
vidual hearsay witnesses did not help predict scale values for jurors' percep-
tions of the sufficiency of the evidence to gauge the credibility, accuracy, and
honesty of the hearsay witnesses or eyewitnesses.
80. F(12,147) = 4.396, p =.0022. Subjects who viewed the "good eyewit-
ness-poor conditions" hearsay witness's testimony were significantly less confi-
dent in their verdicts than were the subjects who viewed the "poor eyewitness-
poor conditions" hearsay witness's testimony. (gs: no hearsay witness = 6.06;
good eyewitness-good conditions = 5.68; good eyewitness-poor conditions =
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F. COMPARISON OF EYEWITNESSES AND HEARSAY WITNESSES
The effects of the source of the testimony and the quality
of the combined testimony of the eyewitness and hearsay wit-
ness on jurors' perceptions of the eyewitnesses and the hearsay
witnesses were also of interest.8 '
Subjects' evaluations of the witnesses and their testimony
often differed depending on whether they saw an eyewitness or
a hearsay witness. Jurors rated eyewitnesses and their testi-
mony more positively than hearsay witnesses and their testi-
mony. Table 2 displays the means of each scale as a function of
testimony source which led researchers to this conclusion.
8 2
Mock jurors' ratings of the quality of a witness's testimony
differed depending on the source of the testimony8s Subjects
felt that the quality of the eyewitness testimony was higher
than the quality of hearsay testimony.8 Additionally, subjects'
perceptions of the accuracy of a witness's testimony depended
on whether the witness experienced the event first-handa 5
Subjects rated the accuracy of eyewitnesses' testimony higher
than hearsay witnesses.86 Jurors' ratings of a witness's charac-
ter,8 7 usefulness of a witness's testimony,88 and the sufficiency
of the evidence a witness provided,8 9 were also more positive
4.74; average eyewitness-good conditions = 6.15; average eyewitness-poor con-
ditions = 5.86; poor eyewitness-good conditions = 5.76; poor eyewitness-poor
conditions = 6.63.).
81. In order to assess these effects, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
the source of the testimony as a within-subject variable and combined testimo-
nial quality as a between-subjects factor, was conducted on jurors' ratings of
the quality of a witness's testimony, accuracy of a witness's memory, a wit-
ness's character, the usefulness of a witness's testimony, the likableness of a
witness, the sufficiency of the evidence provided by a witness and a witness's
motivation to distort his/her testimony. Because the experimental design em-
ployed in this study was not a fully crossed factorial design, a repeated meas-
ures ANOVA could not be conducted on the entire data set. Only those cells
in which subjects viewed a good or poor eyewitness, and a hearsay witness who
testified to the account given by a good or poor eyewitness were included in
the analyses.
82. See Table 2, infra note 90.
83. F(1,37) = 11.28, p = .002.
84. [ts: eyewitness = 5.27, hearsay witness = 4.05.
85. F(1,39) = 21.72, p < .001.
86. ps: eyewitness = 5.36, hearsay witness = 4.19.
87. F(1,39) = 12.51, p = .001 (s: eyewitness = 6.59, hearsay witness =
5.63).
88. F(1,38) = 79.79, p < .001 ([ts: eyewitness = 6.42, hearsay witness =
4.0).
89. F(1,39) = 11.55, p = .002 (ps: eyewitness = 4.19, hearsay witness =
3.47).
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for eyewitnesses than hearsay witnesses'
The overall quality of the testimony received, and the in-
teraction of the source and combined testimonial quality had no
significant effects on jurors' perceptions of the witnesses and
their testimony. Finally, jurors' perceptions of a witness's moti-
vation to distort their testimony in favor of the prosecution or
the defense were not significantly different as a function of the
source of the testimony.
V. DISCUSSION
The present study extends previous findings that juries
rely more heavily on eyewitness testimony than hearsay testi-
mony.91 Jurors' evaluations of the quality of the witness's testi-
mony, the accuracy and the usefulness of that testimony, the
character of the witness and the sufficiency of the evidence pro-
vided by that witness suggest that jurors are more skeptical of
the value and reliability of hearsay testimony than of eyewit-
ness testimony.
This study also replicates previously documented findings
that subjects cannot differentiate between good eyewitnesses
and poor eyewitnesses.92 Even though subjects viewed eyewit-
ness testimony that differed objectively in accuracy their rat-
ings of the eyewitness testimony's quality, accuracy and
usefulness did not differ. More interestingly, this study sug-
90. Table 2







Motivation to Distort 3.85 3.37
Evidence Sufficiency* 4.19 3.47
* indicates that means are significantly different at p.:_ .002.
91. See, e.g., Miene et al., supra note 14.
92. See generally Lindsay et al., Test of Metamemory Hypotheses, supra
note 18 (illustrating that poor witnessing conditions failed to significantly in-
fluence jurors' evaluations of an eyewitness); Wells & Leippe, Memoryfor Pe-
ripheral Detail, supra note 18 (suggesting that jurors' reliance on
eyewitnesses' memories of peripheral detail leads to inaccurate perceptions of
accuracy); Wells et al., Effects of Expert Psychological Testimony, supra note
18 (reviewing recent research concluding that jurors are overly willing to be-
lieve in the accuracy of eyewitness testimony); Cutler et al., supra note 18
(concluding that lay people are insensitive to factors that influence eyewitness
testimony).
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gests that people are sensitive to the quality and accuracy of
hearsay testimony. Subjects in this study were sensitive to the
differences in accuracy of hearsay testimony despite not being
informed about the differences in witnessing conditions for the
hearsay witnesses.
This study's data do not address issues of process, but it is
conceivable that jurors scrutinize hearsay testimony more rig-
orously than eyewitness testimony because they distrust hear-
say testimony inherently. The findings that jurors are
insensitive to the quality of eyewitness testimony, yet are sensi-
tive to the relative accuracy of hearsay evidence, challenge the
legal assumption that jurors can accurately judge the validity of
eyewitness testimony but are incapable of judging the reliabil-
ity of hearsay testimony.
Finally, Landsman and Rakos hypothesize that even if ju-
rors can accurately assess the quality of a hearsay witness's tes-
timony, courts should restrict hearsay evidence at trial because
the trial participants may question the legal proceeding's fair-
ness if the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination.
93
Psychological research further suggests that if participants per-
ceive trial proceedings to be unfair, they will not be satisfied
that justice has been served.9 This study's results suggest that
this concern may be unwarranted. The jurors' satisfaction with
the evidence did not differ between jurors who saw hearsay tes-
timony offered under good witnessing conditions and jurors
who saw only the testimony of an eyewitness. Jurors were less
satisfied with the evidence when they heard the hearsay testi-
mony offered under poor witnessing conditions. This decrease
in the level of juror satisfaction, however, appears to be linked
to the inadequacy of the hearsay evidence presented in these
conditions. If decreased satisfaction in the evidence was the re-
sult of the introduction of any hearsay testimony, irrespective
of its quality, one would expect to see a decrease in juror satis-
faction whenever they are exposed to hearsay evidence. This
pattern of results did not emerge. This study therefore ad-
dresses the question raised by Landsman and Rakos about
whether jurors' perceptions of procedural fairness are ad-
versely affected by the introduction of hearsay evidence. 95
93. Landsman & Rakos, supra note 2, at 79-80.
94. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSY-
CHOLOGICAL ANALYSIs 73-76 (1975) (concluding that mock jurors are more sat-
isfied with an adversarial procedure than a inquisitory procedure in part
because they perceive it to be more fair).
95. Landsman & Rakos, supra note 2, at 79-80.
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There are several limitations on the external validity of the
research reported herein. First, the eyewitness and hearsay ev-
idence were not presented in the context of a full trial. How-
ever, to the extent that the hearsay evidence is more salient in
our study than it might be in the context of a full trial, jurors
would probably give more weight to the hearsay testimony in
the absence of other evidence. To the contrary, jurors consist-
ently evaluated hearsay testimony more negatively than eye-
witness testimony. Additionally, the salience of the hearsay
testimony in this study should provide a strong test of the prop-
osition that the introduction of hearsay evidence will reduce
satisfaction with the trial proceedings. In fact, this study's find-
ings indicate that jurors' satisfaction with the trial evidence de-
creased with the introduction of hearsay evidence only when
that evidence was of poor quality.
Second, attorneys did not subject the eyewitness or the
hearsay witness to rigorous cross-examination. Although legal
scholars' objections to the admissibility of hearsay have often
rested on the inability of the attorney to cross-examine the de-
clarant and the relative ineffectiveness of the cross-examina-
tion of a hearsay witness,96 subjects in this study were skeptical
of hearsay testimony despite the absence of cross-examination.
If attorneys had cross-examined the hearsay witness, that inter-
rogation should decrease jurors' evaluations of the usefulness
and quality of the hearsay testimony. Further research should
examine whether an opponent's cross-examination may further
improve jurors' abilities to determine the probative value of
hearsay evidence. 97
An additional limitation of this study is the absence of the
cautionary instructions that often accompany hearsay testi-
mony. Were hearsay freely admitted, judges would provide ju-
rors with cautionary instructions about the unreliability of
hearsay testimony. These cautionary instructions would be
designed to make jurors more skeptical of hearsay testimony.
Despite the lack of instructions, jurors in our study were al-
ready skeptical of hearsay testimony. The addition of caution-
ary instructions should increase the difference in jurors'
perceptions of the quality and usefulness of eyewitness and
hearsay testimony. Finally, this study did not contain all as-
. 96. Park, supra note 3, at 56 (discussing the advantages provided by cross-
examination of a declarant and the disadvantages of being unable to cross-ex-
amine hearsay declarants).
97. See, e.g., Cutler et al., supra note 18 (concluding that lay people are
insensitive to factors that influence eyewitness testimony).
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pects of a realistic trial simulation. Nonetheless, the missing
trial components would have further reduced the jurors' reli-
ance on hearsay testimony and, therefore, pose little threat to
the validity of our findings.
This Article addresses only one of many issues underlying
calls for hearsay reform. For example, this Article does not ad-
dress whether the exclusion of hearsay evidence produces bene-
ficial effects in some police investigation techniques. Nor does
it address the juror's ability to evaluate hearsay over the entire
spectrum of criminal and civil issues. The jurors' evaluation of
hearsay might differ, for example, in a case with a great deal of
emotional appeal.
Nevertheless, this study's results suggest that, in general,
jurors are skeptical of the quality and usefulness of hearsay tes-
timony. More specifically, jurors in this study were able to dif-
ferentiate among accurate and inaccurate hearsay witnesses. In
contrast, jurors in this and other studies failed to make similar
distinctions among eyewitnesses. This research further sug-
gests that jurors' satisfaction with the evidence and the trial
proceedings is not diminished with the admission of hearsay ev-
idence of good quality. These findings provide some empirical
support for the notion that the legal system should provide ju-
rors with any information that may assist them in resolving the
case, including hearsay evidence.
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